Russia's War in Ukraine: Insights from RAND (2024)

Russia's War in Ukraine: Insights from RAND (1)

Residents flee from the town of Irpin, Ukraine, after heavy shelling by Russia destroyed the only escape route used by locals, March 6, 2022

Photo by Carlos Barria/Reuters

When Russian President Vladimir Putin launched an unprovoked invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, it set off the largest armed conflict in Europe since World War II.

Today, as the fighting continues, casualties mount, and the humanitarian crisis worsens, it's unclear what will happen next. How might the conflict evolve? Is a negotiated settlement possible? And if so, then what are the potential implications of such an agreement? And how can the West continue to hold Putin accountable while mitigating the risks of a wider war between Russia and NATO?

A vast body of previously published RAND research and analysis can shed light on these questions and more. Plus, dozens of RAND experts are providing timely insights that may help inform policy responses to Russia's war.

Featured

  • U.S. Escalation in Ukraine Needs a PlanThe Biden administration's decision to approve Ukraine's use of U.S. weapons to attack targets inside Russia marks another turn of a tit-for-tat spiral that has continuously raised the risks of a broader war without offering a path to ending this one. Without a bargaining process, this spiral dynamic might continue for years to come.

Russian Strategy and Capabilities

  • ReportWhat Is the Invasion of Ukraine Costing Russia?As of September 2022, Russia's military costs of its invasion of Ukraine reached $40 billion. GDP losses in 2022 were between $81 billion and $104 billion. Russia can sustain these costs for at least several years but over the long term its economy and standard of living are likely to decline.Dec 18, 2023
  • CommentaryPutin's Shake-Up of Russian Military LeadershipMay 24, 2024
  • ReportLogistics and Sustainment Issues of the Russian Armed ForcesNov 15, 2023
  • ReportWill to Fight of Russia's Private Military ActorsJul 31, 2023
  • CommentaryThe Russian “Firehose of Falsehood” Propaganda Model: Why It Might Work and Options to Counter ItSep 8, 2016
  • ReportWhat Drives Russia's Military Interventions?Sep 27, 2021
  • ReportRussia's Grand StrategyAug 16, 2021
  • ReportUnderstanding Russia's Hostile Measures and How to Counter ThemJan 7, 2020
  • ReportCountering Russia's Malign and Subversive Information EffortsAug 16, 2021

Ukrainian Capabilities, Civilian Resistance, and the Will to Fight

  • EssayPostwar Ukraine: Planning for a Successful and Secure RecoveryTo rebuild successfully, Ukraine will need to come out of the war on a new trajectory. It already has an outline of what recovery will look like. The plan looks beyond the immediate damages and envisions more than $750 billion in economic support and projects that would raise a new Ukraine from the destruction. Jan 5, 2024
  • CommentaryHow to Win in Ukraine: Pour It On, and Don't Worry About EscalationMay 22, 2024
  • CommentaryBiden's Catch-22 in UkraineMay 20, 2024
  • CommentaryHere's What Ukraine Needs in Missiles, Shells, and Troops to Win. It's Completely DoableMay 2, 2024
  • ReportUkrainian Civilians' Contributions to Resisting RussiaAug 15, 2023
  • ReportCivilian Resilience in the Baltic StatesNov 1, 2021
  • Research BriefWhy Understanding 'Will to Fight' Is CrucialSep 13, 2019
  • ReportSecurity Sector Reform in UkraineOct 5, 2016
  • ReportDeterring Russian Aggression in the Baltic StatesApr 15, 2019

Refugees and the Humanitarian Crisis

  • CommentaryThe EU Can't Treat Ukrainian Refugees Like Short-Term VisitorsAlthough EU countries, communities, and citizens have been very welcoming to Ukrainian refugees, it is not enough to treat them as short-term visitors, meet their immediate humanitarian needs, and let them wait out the war. By educating and employing them instead, EU countries can enrich their own communities and support Ukraine.Jul 24, 2023
  • ReportWeighing Options for Ukraine's RecoveryMay 2, 2023
  • CommentaryWith the Ukrainians, Avoid the Mistakes of Other Refugee CrisesMar 25, 2022
  • CommentaryFor Ukrainian Refugees in Poland, Livelihood Needs Will Follow Humanitarian OnesMar 18, 2022
  • ReportNew Solutions Are Urgently Needed for Displaced PopulationsAug 26, 2021
  • ReportSyrian Refugees Can Add Value to Middle Eastern Labor MarketsDec 13, 2018
  • Research BriefWin-Win Solutions for Syrian Refugees—and Their HostsDec 13, 2018
  • ReportUrgent Attention Is Needed to Improve Education for Syrian Refugee ChildrenNov 23, 2015
  • CommentaryColombia's Trailblazing Model for RefugeesMar 26, 2021

Diplomatic and Political Dimensions

  • Research BriefThe Day After: Postwar U.S. Strategy Toward RussiaHow should the United States deal with Russia after the war in Ukraine finally ends? And how might U.S. policy during the conflict shape the postwar world?Feb 9, 2024
  • Research BriefUnderstanding the Risk of Escalation in the War in UkraineSep 21, 2023
  • CommentaryHow Finland and Sweden Bolster NATOMar 7, 2024
  • CommentaryJoining NATO Is Not Enough to Defend Ukraine: Allies Must Step UpDec 28, 2023
  • ReportWhat If Russia Crossed the Nuclear Threshold in Ukraine?Oct 5, 2023
  • ReportReconstructing Ukraine: Creating a Freer, More Prosperous, and Secure FutureJun 14, 2023
  • CommentaryAvoiding a Long War in UkraineJan 25, 2023
  • CommentaryResponding to a Russian Attack on NATO During the Ukraine WarDec 20, 2022
  • ReportThe Chinese-Russian Relationship and Its Risks to U.S. InterestsOct 12, 2021

U.S. Strategic Competition with Russia

  • ReportHow U.S. Rivals Think About Competitive AdvantageChina's and Russia's conceptions of societal sources of competitive advantage rely on powerfully centralized efforts that reflect decisive degrees of national unity, coordination, and will. The nature of this thinking poses greater risks to U.S. deterrence policy than differences in military power.Mar 12, 2024
  • CommentaryU.S. Strategic Competition with Russia Is Here to StayJan 31, 2022
  • ReportDeterrence and Escalation in Competition with RussiaJan 20, 2022
  • CommentaryHow Would NATO Compete with Russia?Jun 22, 2021
  • ReportExtending Russia: Competing for Advantageous GroundApr 24, 2019
  • ReportStabilizing Great-Power RivalriesNov 29, 2021
  • ReportWhat Deters and WhyNov 20, 2018
  • ReportUnderstanding the Deterrent Impact of U.S. Overseas ForcesFeb 4, 2020
  • ReportEmerging Opportunities for Engagement on NATO's Northeastern FlankJun 29, 2017
Russia's War in Ukraine: Insights from RAND (2024)
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